Mandatory Supply Management: A Dairy Policy Option by Jacobson, Robert E.
MANDATORY SUPPLY MANAGEMENT: 
A DAIRY POLICY OPTION 
D~c'l!I! Ohio ~perative ~xte~sion Service .__IM~_.IAJ .._ The Ohio State University 
Compiled by: 
Robert E. Jacobson 
Extension .Agricultural Economist 
and Professor, .Agricultural Economics 
and Rural Sociology Department, OSU 
00,D 
8 For Sale Publlcatlon 
All educauanal programs and acttv1t1es conducted by the Ohto Cooperative Extension Serv1Cf) are ava1lat>le to all potent•al 
cllentete on a non-d1scnmmatory basis without regard to race, color, national ongm, sex, handicap or religious affiliation 
L0/86 - lM 
l'Ml.8t Jn further&11oe of Oooperatwe Ex'l'ensloll ~ Acas df MJ,y 8 and Jl.iRe SO. 1$14, in ~with the U.S, O'epartment of 
~r!Ou~re. J. Mld1.aeJ ~prott, Plrector of the Ohio ~se~ lhe PWo $$ ~-
Mandatory Supply Management - A Dairy Policy Option 
Introduction 
The prospect of a continuing supply-demand 
imbalance, still lower support prices, and an on-
going erosion of dairy farmer equity are prompt-
ing renewed interest in mandatory supply-
management as a solution to the dairy industry's 
dilemma. 
Mandatory supply management or quota pro-
grams are not new. They were proposed in the 
1930s, the early 1960s, and again in the early 
1970s during periods when excessive milk sup-
plies depressed milk prices and farm incomes. 
Since then, both Canada, and more recently, the 
European Common Market, have adopted this 
form of market regulation. In the United States, 
we have historically chosen other options, but 
the issue appears to be before us again. 
The Milk Diversion Program and the Dairy 
Termination Program were recent attempts at 
voluntary supply-management, in that dairymen 
could opt to participate or not to participate in 
these programs. The diversion program produced 
a very short-lived reduction in the national milk 
supply, but milk production rebounded almost 
immediately after the end of the program in 
April 1985. Although it is still too early to judge 
the final outcome of the Dairy Termination Pro-
gram, it will undoubtedly have a longer-term im-
pact than the diversion program. There appears 
to be much skepticism among industry leaders, 
however, as to how effective the program will be 
in curtailing production beyond 1987. 
Thus, the two ends of the policy spectrum that 
will be confronting the industry are: should 
milk prices be allowed to continue to fall until 
production adjusts to bring supply and demand 
into balance, or should the industry adopt a 
mandatory supply control program that would 
limit each producer to a share of the national 
market, under some form of market quota 
allocation. 
In order to assist dairymen and industry lead-
ers in understanding and evaluating the present 
dairy policy options, we have prepared a seven-
letter series that will attempt to review in a 
brief, but factual manner, what mandatory 
supply-management involves, some examples of 
existing programs, and lessons we can learn from 
them. Additionally, this series looks at how a 
proposed U.S. quota program might be structured, 
and how it might impact on various segments of 
the industry. 
Our aim is to provide a factual and unbiased 
overview of supply management as a policy op-
tion, with particular emphasis on mandatory 
supply control programs since that seems to be 
where the interest currently lies. 
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1 Mandatory Supply Management - A Dairy Policy Option WHY THE CURRENT INTEREST IN SUPPLY MANAGEMENT? Walter C. Wasserman, Cornell University 
Over the last six years the dairy industry has 
been plagued with an overwhelming supply-
demand imbalance. Milk production has in-
creased by 20 billion pounds from 1979 to 1985, 
while commercial demand has increased by only 
half that amount. Government purchases under 
the price support program rose dramatically from 
2.1 billion pounds of milk equivalent in 1979 to 
a peak of 16.8 billion pounds in 1983, at a cost 
exceeding 2.5 billion dollars for the year. Record 
production, record USDA purchases of dairy 
products and record price support expenditures 
characterized the years from 1981 to 1983. At-
tempts at discouraging milk production during 
this period were centered primarily in the area 
of price support adjustments. Then from 
1983-85, there was a period of policy in nova ti on, 
as support price drops were combined with vol-
untary supply control programs in a further at-
tempt to reduce government purchases and ex-
penditures. Milk prices received by farmers fell 
$2.12/cwt between May 1981 and May 1986 after 
adjusting for deductions. The effective all milk 
price for May 1986 was $11.38/cwt, the lowest 
price in eight years. Dairy farmer equity has de-
teriorated as well and the question being raised 
is "What will it take to bring the dairy industry 
back to a long-term equilibrium condition, with 
milk supply and demand in reasonable balance 
and farm milk prices that will afford a reason-
able return to labor and capital?" Some will 
answer that mandatory supply controls are the 
only option remaining, while others will argue 
just as vehemently that controls or quotas are not 
the answer. 
Dairy Policy Review 1982-85 
At the beginning of 1982, support prices were 
established in accordance with the Agriculture 
and Food Act of 1981. This Act specified a 
support price of $13.10 (at 3.67% fat test) 
through September 1982 and $13.25 from October 
1982 through September 1983, unless support 
purchases or expenditures dropped to specified 
levels which would trigger higher prices based on 
70 or 75 percent of parity. The inadequacy of 
this policy became obvious almost immediately 
and the search began for an alternative. 
In late August 1982, Congress passed leg-
islation changing support policy under the Om-
nibus Reconciliation Act. This Act attempted to 
reconcile the differences between advocates of a 
simple cut in the support price (e.g., the adminis-
tration) and those who favored a more complex 
plan involving a two-tiered base-excess pricing 
scheme (e.g., National Milk Producers Federa-
tion). Congress froze the support price at $13.10 
through September 1984 and gave the Secretary 
authority to directly assess producers up to one 
dollar per hundredweight (in two 50-cent incre-
ments), provided projected price support pur-
chases did not fall below certain levels. Opposi-
tion to this modified price support program came 
from all segments of the dairy industry and all 
around the country, despite the fact that the 
program reduced the farmers' effective price less 
than most of the alternatives. 
This general dissatisfaction with the existing 
legislation led to passage of the Dairy Production 
and Stabilization Act (DPSA) in the fall of 1983. 
The DPSA initiated a set of program changes 
and a sequence of events without precedent. The 
DPSA combined four major actions. First, it 
lowered the support price by $.50 per hundred-
weight as of December 1983, and it authorized 
further reductions of 50 cents/cwt in April and 
July of 1985. Second, it authorized a direct as-
sessment of $.50/cwt against all farm marketings 
of milk from December 1, 1983 through 
March 31, 1985. Third, it off erect payments of 
$10.00/cwt of milk "diverted" to farmers who 
agreed to sell less milk in 1984 and the first 
quarter of 1985 than they did during a base pe-
riod. Fourth, all farmers were required to con-
tribute 15 cents/cwt of milk marketed to a Na-
tional Dairy Promotion and Research Program, 
although credits of up to $.10/cwt were allowed 
for contributions to similar regional or statewide 
programs. 
The Milk Diversion Program, as it was known, 
was successful in reducing 1984 milk production 
by 4 billion pounds and government purchases 
under the price support program by 8 billion 
pounds, but its success was short lived. Milk 
production began to increase sharply as soon 
as the program terminated in March 1985, 
culminating in another record year. U.S. milk 
production topped 143 billion pounds in 1985, 
and although commercial sales continued to im-
prove, CCC purchases increased by 53%. 
The 1983 farm bill expired on October I, 
1985, but Congress failed to deliver a new policy 
on schedule. The House and Senate conferees fi-
nally agreed on the provisions of the 1985 Farm 
Bill on December 14, 1985. The bill was ap-
proved by both the House and the Senate the 
following week and was signed into law by the 
President on December 23. 
The "Food and Security Act of 1985" covers a 
period of five years, through calendar 1990. The 
major dairy provisions of the Act include: an 
$11.60 support price through December, 1986. 
Price supports at $11.35 from January 1 to 
September 30, 1987 and at $11.10 on October 1, 
1987. On January 1, 1988 and every January 
thereafter, the support price may be reduced by 
50 cents if net removals by the govern:rnent are 
projected to exceed 5 billion pounds. In addi-
tion, the bill authorized the Secretary of Agricul-
ture to initiate a Dairy Termination Program by 
April 1, 1986. The objective of the program was 
to reduce milk production by 12 billion pounds. 
Producers submitted bids which, if accepted, pro-
vided them with a payment in return for ceasing 
milk production for a five-year period. The bill 
also provided for an assessment of 40 cents per 
cwt on all milk as of April 1, 1986 and a reduced 
assessment of 25 cents per cwt from January 1 to 
September 30, 1987. Additionally, there were 
provisions that raised Class I differentials in 35 
Federal Order markets, provided for the es-
tablishment of a national dairy commission, and 
addressed a number of other dairy concerns. 
The DTP was successful in retiring 12.28 bil-
lion pounds or 8.7% of the milk marketed in 
1985, thus fullfilling its primary goal. Our pre-
liminary projections indicate that the program 
will have a positive impact in reducing milk 
supplies and increasing farm milk prices during 
the summer and fall of 1986 and 1987. The 
greatest uncertainty pertains to the period 
1988-90, at which time the current legislation 
falls back on the disincentive of lower price 
supports to curtail supply-demand imbalances. 
There seems to be great skepticism among some 
segments of the industry that these provisions 
will be able to sustain a balanced market. 
The Supply-Demand-Price Outlook 
At the present time, indications are that the 
current dairy policy and market conditions are 
in fact bringing supply and demand into better 
balance. 
In July, U.S. milk production declined by 1% 
from year earlier levels following increases of up 
to 7% during the first quarter of the year. Milk 
cow numbers continued to decline for the sev-
enth consecutive month, reflecting the DTP and 
dairy price policy. July cow numbers were down 
2.3% from July, 1985. 
Even more significant in the long run is a 6% 
decline in the number of dairy replacements on 
farms on July 1. By the end of July, 642,000 
dairy cattle had been removed from farms under 
the DTP. 
Commercial disappearance (sales) has con-
tinued to increase dramatically. For the first six 
months of 1986, commercial disappearance in-
creased 4.2% compared to the same period in 
1985. Lower milk production, moderate increases 
in commercial sales and sharply lower govern-
ment purchases are forecast for 1987. 
U.S. Supply and Use of Milk 
1983 1984 1985 1986* 1987** 
Production 139.7 135.4 143.7 145.1 142.0 
Farm Use 2.4 3.1 2.6 2.3 2.3 
Marketings 137.3 132.3 141.l 142.8 139.7 
Beg. Comm. Stocks 4.6 5.2 4.9 4.6 5.1 
Imports 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 2.8 
TOTAL 144.5 140.2 148.8 150.3 147.6 
======================================= 
Comm. Dis. 122.5 126.7 131.0 134.8 137.0 
End. Comm. Stocks 5.2 4.9 4.6 4.8 5.2 
Net Removals 16.8 8.6 13.2 10.7 5.4 
TOTAL 144.5 140.2 148.8 150.3 147.6 
Farm Price 
All Milk $13.57 $13.45 $12.73 $12.25 $12.30 
NY-NJ Blend $13.23 $13.03 $12.32 $11.98 $12.00 
Avg. Annual 
Assessment $ .48 .50 .13 .36 .19 
Eff. Price $12.75 $12.53 $12.19 $11.62 $11.81 
1986 adjusted for DTP&; G-R-H (through September 30, 1986). 
*Projected. 
**Forecast. 
There are a number of factors, however, that 
could lead to a deterioration of these favorable 
market conditions by 1988. Low feed prices 
and/or the introduction of bGH could stimulate 
greater production increases, particularly as milk 
prices strengthen while weakness in the economy 
could curtail further growth in demand. 
The continuing threat of still lower support 
prices leading to further price instability and 
low returns to dairymen is fueling the interest in 
mandatory supply control as a dairy policy 
option. 
2 Mandatory Supply Management - A Dairy Policy Option ALTERNATIVE VOLUNTARY SUPPLY MANAGEMENT POLICIES 
FOR THE DAIRY INDUSTRY 
Harry M. Kaiser, Cornell Unzverszty 
This educational series is primarily concerned 
with analyzing the range of mandatory quota 
programs as alternatives to current dairy policy. 
However, it is important to recognize that 
mandatory quotas are not the only type of 
supply management program available for 
"managing" our milk supply. To add a broader 
perspective of the concept of supply management 
to this series of publications, this article de-
scribes the general notion of supply management, 
and several forms of voluntary supply manage-
ment programs that have been proposed for na-
tional dairy policy over the last several decades. 
What are Supply Management Programs? 
Interest in supply management almost always 
develops when supply begins to outpace demand. 
In order to bring demand and supply into bal-
ance, policy prescriptions tend to emphasize sup-
ply rather than demand adjustments, with pro-
ducer finance promotion programs as an ex-
ception to this rule. The reason for this is sim-
ple. Demand for milk is quite stable--easy to 
forecast, but difficult to alter in the short run. 
It is hard to increase demand because of the dif-
ficulty in changing consumers' tastes, preferences 
and habits. Supply, on the other hand, can be 
controlled more readily through government pro-
grams that offer producers economic incentives 
(or disincentives) to encourage a desired level of 
production. By offering producers incentives, or 
disincentives, the government can adjust pro-
duction to be more in line with consumption. In 
the past, U.S. dairy policy has always resorted to 
voluntary supply management programs or ad-
justments in prices to control production. 
Although the term "supply management" has 
been used frequently in recent discussions about 
alternative dairy policies, it is difficult to find a 
standard definition of what this phrase means. 
The term has come to mean different things to 
different people. For example, some have used it 
synonymously with specific programs like the 
Milk Diversion Program, Dairy Termination Pro-
gram, or milk quotas. Others have interpreted 
supply management more generally to mean any 
policy designed to balance supply with prevailing 
demand. The more popular definition of supply 
management is supply control. 
An important distinction between alternative 
types of supply management programs is whether 
producer participation is voluntary or compul-
sory. Voluntary programs seek to adjust total 
production in relation to projected consumption 
by providing economic incentives to dairy farm-
ers for voluntarily cutting back or ceasing pro-
duction. Because they are not compulsory, these 
programs must make the incentives strong 
enough to encourage a sufficient number of 
farmers to participate in order to bring supply 
into adjustment with demand. 
Mandatory programs (e.g., quotas) seek to limit 
total production by penalizing those who produce 
in excess of their assigned bases. Penalties have 
to be severe enough to discourage the majority of 
farmers from exceeding their quotas, ranging in 
severity from receiving a lower price to no price 
at all on any milk sold over one's quota. The ef-
fects of a quota plan on income and production 
depends on the period on which quotas are 
based, how frequently they are adjusted, and 
whether they are transferable. 
While voluntary programs have been imple-
mented in the past to reduce milk production, a 
national compulsory program has never been 
established in the U.S. One reason is that 
mandatory programs would be a radical depar-
ture from past and current dairy policies that 
allow farmers complete freed om in determining 
how much to produce. 
Alternative Voluntary 
Supply Management Programs 
Over the past 20 years, several voluntary pro-
grams have been proposed and some adopted in 
an attempt to reduce surpluses in milk pro-
duction. One common element of all these pro-
grams is the fact that they were designed to 
work with (as opposed to being a replacement 
for) the two principal U.S. dairy programs: Price 
Support Program (PSP) and Federal Milk Market~ 
ing Order Program (FMMOP). Generally speak-
ing, the PSP indirectly supports the price of milk 
through government purchases of butter, nonfat 
dry milk, and cheese to enable manufacturers to 
pay the support price for milk purchased from 
farmers. The F:MMOP promotes "orderly" mar-
keting conditions by requiring milk handlers to 
pay farmers minimum prices for fluid eligible 
milk depending upon how the milk is used. The 
proceeds are then pooled in the market and 
farmers receive a uniform or blend price. The 
following are some of the voluntary programs 
that have been proposed to operate in conjunc-
tion with the F:MMOP and PSP. 
Class I Base Plans: Class I base plans were 
authorized for Federal Milk Marketing Orders in 
1965. These programs are sometimes called two-
tiered pricing programs because farmers receive 
different class prices (rather than a blend price) 
on fluid base and over fluid base milk market-
ings. If adopted in a marketing order, all farm-
ers are assigned an annual Class I base, which is 
equal to the market percentage of Class I (fluid) 
sales multiplied by their base marketings. All 
milk sold up to one's base receives the Class I 
price and all milk sold over this base receives the 
Class II (manufacturing) price. Farmers have 
incentives to reduce the amount of milk they sell 
under this program because the weighted average 
price becomes higher the more one reduces milk 
marketings. Since the 1965 legislation allowed 
Class I base to be bought and sold, farmers wish-
ing to expand or increase the average price they 
received could purchase additional quotas from 
other farmers. In the 1981 farm bill, authoriza-
tion for Class I plans was discontinued because 
of a lack of interest in the program by dairy 
farmers (only two marketing orders, Puget Sound 
and Georgia, had approved them). 
Voluntary Quota Program (VQP ): Although 
never enacted, VQPs were seriously considered in 
the early 1960s as a form of supply management. 
Under this program, producers would be assigned 
a base, similar to mandatory quotas, but would 
not be directly penalized if they chose to pro-
duce in excess of their base. Instead, economic 
incentives would be offered to farmers to cut 
back production by guaranteeing them a higher 
price on a percent of their marketings if they 
stay within their base. The cost of the program 
would presumably be offset by a reduction in 
the support price for milk. As a result, prices 
would fall somewhat for producers not partici-
pating in the program due to the reduction in 
the support price. This program is quite similar 
to the Deficiency Payment Program for wheat 
and corn, which provides income payments to 
farmers in return for reducing plantings by a 
specified percent below their acreage bases. One 
reason why this program was never enacted was 
the high budgetary costs predicted for the VQP. 
Milk Diversion Program (MDP): The 1984-85 
MDP offered direct payments to those producers 
who agreed to reduce their marketings from 5% 
to 30% below their established base. In return 
for their reductions, participants were paid $10 
per hundredweight on all diverted milk. Par-
ticipants had the option of reducing milk mar-
ketings by cow culling, decreasing cow numbers, 
feeding less, or increasing the farm use of milk. 
Because it is not very difficult for a participant 
in such programs to increase production in a 
short period of time after the program expires, 
supplies are likely to rebound almost immedi-
ately after the program is terminated. This is 
what happened in 1985, when the MDP expired. 
Whole Herd Buyout Program (WHBP ): The 
1986 program provides for payments to farmers 
who voluntarily agree to cease producing milk 
for five years. Under the Dairy Termination 
Program, which it is formally called, farmers 
were invited to submit bids on how much the 
government would have to pay them to quit pro-
ducing milk over this five-year period and the 
government either accepted or rejected each pro-
ducer's bid. If a farmer's bid was accepted, he 
or she was required to dispose of all dairy cattle 
by export or slaughter and remain out of dairy-
ing for five years. WHBP's are probably more 
effective in reducing production than MDP's be-
cause participants have to completely stop pro-
ducing milk. Unlike MDP's, the problem of a 
swift rebound in production after the WHBP ex-
pires is reduced because it is difficult and costly 
to return to milk production after being out of 
the business for five years. 
When production gets out of line with de-
mand, the use of voluntary supply management 
programs can be an effective way to adjust milk 
supplies. Recent U.S. experiences with the MDP 
and the DTP have shown that this form of sup-
ply management has been able to reduce pro-
duction relative to what it would have been un-
der no program. The main advantage of volun-
tary programs is that they place less restrictions 
on individual producers and, if designed prop-
erly, they may be relatively inexpensive in terms 
of government expenditures. 
One potential problem with voluntary pro-
grams is that they may cause milk shortages in 
certain regions of the U.S. For example, under 
the MDP, the southern regions of the U.S. experi-
enced a relatively high degree of participation. 
Milk for fluid use from other regions had to be 
shipped to these states at higher prices in order 
to satisfy regional demand by consumers. The 
same pattern is emerging due to the DTP. This 
represents a problem because it causes a mis-
allocation of resources and especially hits milk 
handlers in these areas. 
3 Mandatory Supply Management - A Dairy Policy Option THE CANADIAN MILK QUOT A SYSTEM 
Fred C. Webster. University of Vermont 
In Canada, milk utilized in manufacturing 
dairy products is regulated by a national quota 
program and milk used in fluid products is sub-
ject to separate provincial quotas. Canada opted 
for a national quota program in 1970 although 
some of the provincial fluid programs were insti-
tuted prior to 1970. This leaflet looks at the 
Canadian system of milk quotas. 
Conditions Leading to the 
Canadian Quota Program 
Milk production and marketing from farms in 
Canada has changed drastically in this century. 
As the industry developed, farms near the cities 
concentrated on supplying fresh, fluid milk 
needs and more distant farms produced milk for 
storable dairy products. 
However, the regular daily demand for fresh, 
high-quality milk in fluid markets made for un-
stable prices and frequent marketing changes as 
processors sought extra supplies to cover short-
ages or limited their milk receipts to avoid a 
surplus. Also, increases in productivity per cow 
and per farm meant that fewer farms were 
needed to supply the market. Market uncertainty 
meant high risk for investment in the modern 
dairy production facilities needed to make use of 
new technology. 
In response to these problems, the Canadian 
Dairy Commission (CDC) was established in 1967 
to oversee a supply management program for the 
dairy industry. Today, quotas appear to be 
strongly supported by the Canadian dairy 
industry. 
Components of the Canadian Program 
As in the U.S., the Canadian milk marketing 
system divides milk according to use as fluid 
milk and industrial milk (for use in manufac-
tured dairy products). Farmers may or may not 
belong to a cooperative but they all have to pay 
a hauling charge for getting their milk to a re-
ceiving plant and each pays part of the cost of 
the price support program through assessments. 
Beyond that, the system is far different. For 
one thing, Canada is a federation of large 
provinces--each with a great deal more indepen-
dence than individual states in the U.S. Due to 
their size and geography, no milk for fluid use 
moves between provinces. Also, milk marketing 
quotas to control production, prices for each 
class of milk, rules covering transfer of quotas, 
and assessments to cover program costs are set by 
each province--not the federal government. 
The supply management effort is coordinated 
by the Canadian Milk Supply Management Com-
mittee (CMSMC). The Committee is made up of 
representatives of provincial producer marketing 
boards, provincial government agencies, and the 
CDC. All major policy issues are normally set by 
unanimous consent of all the provinces, usually 
after being discussed at two meetings of the 
committee. 
Canadian dairy farmers receive two quotas--
one for fluid and one for MSQ (market-sharing 
quota) of industrial or manufacturing milk. 
Fluid quotas are determined by each province 
based on estimates of its fluid needs. Industrial 
milk needs are estimated nationally by the 
CMSMC and the MSQ allocated to each province 
on an historical basis. The provinces, in turn, 
allocate fluid quotas and MSQ among producers. 
Market share or MSQ is expressed as kilograms 
of butterfat. If supply or demand changes 
sharply, the kilograms of quota may be adjusted 
up or down on a proportional basis. 
The responsibility for exporting dairy prod-
ucts that are surplus to domestic requirements 
rests with the CDC. Since world market prices 
of dairy products are highly subsidized in most 
cases, the disposal costs incurred by the CDC are 
met through levies on all producer shipments of 
industrial milk. The CDC determines the antici-
pated costs of surplus disposal prior to each new 
dairy year and, after discussion with the 
CDSMC, sets the levies required to defray the 
anticipated costs. 
Both within-quota and over-quota levies are 
used. The within-quota levy is needed to cover the 
cost of exporting skim milk powder and to de-
f ray surplus removal costs of product made from 
within-quota milk not needed to meet Canadian 
requirements. The over-quota levy is set at a 
level high enough to market surplus whole milk 
products on world markets. It is this over-quota 
levy which makes supply management effective, 
because it is so high that it discourages most pro-
ducers from over-supplying their market shares. 
The policies used to administer the market 
sharing quota system vary from province to 
province but must conform with the provisions 
of the national plan. For example, in Ontario 
the provincial allotment of market sharing quota 
was initially divided among all the producers in 
accordance with their manufacturing milk ship-
ments in a base period. 
While MSQ is an annual quota, fluid quota is 
set on a daily basis. Both are transferable among 
producers. Producers wishing to buy or sell MSQ 
or fluid quota submit their offers by a computer-
operated quota exchange. Volumes and prices of 
quota submitted by potential buyers and sellers 
are matched. All transfers must take place over 
the exchange, except for within-family transfers 
and transfers involving ongoing farm operations. 
Both used and unused MSQ can be transferred, 
but not loaned or rented. With the exception of 
within-family transfers, transfers of quota are 
subject to an assessment of 15%. 
Producers must market at least 85% of their 
quota. A producer marketing less than this 
amount may have his quota reduced unless he 
sells the amount of quota subject to reduction. 
The purpose of the maintenance requirement is 
to encourage high utilization of quota within the 
Province, and to ensure that producers will not 
short the market. 
Experience with the Canadian Program 
It is difficult to separate the results of supply 
management in Canada from other features of 
the industry. During the 15 years under this sys-
tem, substantial changes have occurred in the 
structure of the Canadian Industry. Dairy farm 
numbers have dropped by some 92,000 or 67%. 
Total production has remained relatively un-
changed and is presently in the order of 16-17 
billion pounds a year. Herd size has about dou-
bled while milk production per farm has tripled. 
Structural Changes in the Producing Sector 
of the Canadian Dairy Industry--1970 to 1985 
Milk Dairy Shipments per Average 
Year shipments farms dairy farm herd size 
Bil. lbs. Thous. Pounds Cows 
1970 16.8 186.8 122,920 18 
1975 16.0 84.8 189,850 24 
1980 16.8 56.4 289,118 31 
1985 16.5 44.6 869,289 38 
Source: Statistics Canada, Canadian Dairy Commission. 
One way to compare returns to Canadian 
farmers with their U.S. cousins is to look at re-
cent returns for a well-managed, actual Ontario 
farm. This farm was slightly above average size 
(for Ontario) and had nearly its maximum quota 
(Ontario Dairy Board policies limit quota per 
farm). The farm had an annual quota of 373,517 
pounds fluid milk (1,023 lbs./day) and 226,761 
pounds of MSQ (about 621 lbs./day). To match 
production with quota, the owner followed a 
careful culling program geared to the farm's 
quota, not just the productivity of individual 
cows. 
This farmer received Canadian $23.13/cwt for 
fluid milk and Canadian $18.06/cwt for indus-
trial milk in 1985. Total milk marketed was over 
quota by 8,080 pounds. The average price, in-
cluding federal subsidy and deducting various 
levies was Canadian $19.81/cwt or about 
U.S. $13.86/cwt. After allowance for hauling, 
milk promotion, and other fees, the average price 
was Canadian $18.56/cwt or U.S. $12.99/cwt. 
During the same period, the "all milk" price to 
U.S. farmers was 39 cents lower ($12.60/cwt 
after adjustment for government price support 
assessments). 
Investment in quota can be estimated by the 
rate at which it has sold on the quota exchange 
operated by the Ontario Milk Marketing Board. 
Recent prices are about U.S. $28/cwt or 
U.S. $4,200 for a 15,000 pound cow's annual pro-
duction. Obviously, this is more than the total 
value of one year of milk production and repre-
sents over one-third of the total capital needed 
to operate an Ontario dairy farm. 
With supply management, supplies (except for 
nonfat dry milk) have been kept reasonably close 
to market requirements. Costs to the government 
have been reduced by controlling supply, raising 
milk prices, and levying assessments on milk 
marketed by dairy farmers. Although net farm 
milk prices in Canada are slightly higher than 
U.S. averages, Canadian farmers have sharply 
higher investments in their farms because of the 
quota value. Also Canadian farmers must man-
age production closely: under production may 
mean loss of quota; milk sold over quota nets lit-
tle more than the hauling cost. 
Supply management has not stopped farms 
from exiting the dairy industry. In fact. the sale 
value of quotas may have encouraged some 
farmers to cash in their assets. Restrictions on 
quota sales to family-sized operations in some 
provinces may have limited the development of 
very large milk production units. The Canadian 
system provides some valuable lessons, but would 
not adapt easily to U.S. conditions. 
4 Mandatory Supply Management - A Dairy Policy Option THE EUROPEAN CO:rv.tMUNITY'S MILK QUOT A SYSTEM 
Bernard F. Stanton, Cornell University 
The ten countries of the EC, excluding Spain 
and Portugal who have just joined, constitute the 
world's largest producing and consuming block 
for milk and dairy products. With 280 million 
consumers and 25 million cows, the EC is the 
dominant force in world markets for dairy prod-
ucts. The size and importance of the dairy 
sector in the EC is hard for most Americans to 
appreciate. It accounts for 20% of the value of 
agricultural production in the Community and 
affects more farmers (1.6 million) than any other 
product. Because milk production consistently 
outpaced consumption between 1975 and 1984, 
the EC adopted a mandatory quota program in 
1984 to curtail what had become the largest 
dairy surplus in the world. 
Conditions Leading to the EC Quota Program 
The adoption of a mandatory quota system for 
milk production in EC-10 on April 2, 1984, oc-
curred because earlier, less stringent efforts 
to bring supply into balance with demand had 
failed. Between 1973-75, supply was roughly in 
balance with domestic consumption plus exports 
at 80-83 million metric tons. By 1983, production 
had climbed to nearly 104 million metric tons 
(about 213 billion pounds) while consumption 
and exports together remained relatively constant 
at 82 million metric tons. A surplus approaching 
20% of production resulted. 
The EC Commission's first new initiatives to 
balance supply with demand began in 1977 with 
enactment of a producer co-responsibility levy. 
A flat rate deduction of 2.5% of the target price 
from all producers' milk deliveries to dairies was 
used to help pay for disposal and promotional 
programs. In 1979, 1980, and 1981, the Commis-
sion proposed a super-levy to be applied to milk 
delivered in excess of defined base quantities, 
but none of these proposals were accepted by the 
Council of Ministers. Meanwhile, the size of the 
surplus continued to grow and the costs of the 
program to the Community escalated even with a 
3% cut in guaranteed prices to producers in 1982. 
The Commission in September 1983 estimated 
that in order to offset just the added cost likely 
to arise if existing guaranteed prices continued, 
the milk price for 1984-85 would have to be de-
creased by 12%. Based on much discussion, the 
current quota program was adopted six months 
later. 
One reason why it was so difficult to get po-
litical support to use reductions in producers' 
prices to try to balance supply with demand is 
the structure of the dairy industry in the 10 
countries of the EC, and the requirement that 
any change in legislation requires a unanimous 
vote in the Council of Ministers. In the EC, 73% 
of all dairy farms had less than 20 cows in 1983 
and accounted for nearly one-third of total pro-
duction. In the U.S., 42% of the farms had less 
than 20 cows but accounted for only 5% of pro-
duction in 1982. Politically, small dairy pro-
ducers of the EC are much more powerful; their 
net incomes are low and many are located in dis-
advantaged areas. It is this large group of more 
than one million farmers with low incomes who 
provided the final impetus for the acceptance of 
a quota system. 
Components of the EC Program 
The Community in 1984 consisted of 10 
sovereign nations, each with its own Ministry of 
Agriculture and its own set of government 
institutions. This necessitated that guaranteed 
Community total quantities or base marketings 
be first divided among the 10 nations. Each na-
tion was then given the responsibility to divide 
up the national base either directly to individual 
farms or to dairies receiving milk from farmers. 
1. According to the Commission of the EC, the 
basic concept was an ... "annual guaranteed 
total quantity of milk for the Community as 
a whole, corresponding in principle to the 
quantity of cows' milk delivered to dairies 
and other undertakings treating or process-
ing milk in 1981 plus 1%." Exceptions to this 
basic rule were made for Ireland and Italy, 
who were allowed to use 1983 marketings as 
their guaranteed bases. Most member states 
chose to base the determination of reference 
quantities for producers (production bases) 
on the 1983 calendar year adjusted down-
ward by the appropriate percentage. 
2. 'The quota system is applicable to all de-
liveries of cows' milk for 5 consecutive years 
beginning April 1, 1984. 
3. The flat-rate co-responsibility levy was con-
tinued and increased to 3% for the 1984-85 
marketing year. 
4. A "Community reserve" was established to 
allow member states some latitude in solving 
local problems in assigning quotas and 
facilitating the change-over during the first 
two years. 
5. Separate quota arrangements were estab-
lished for producers who sold directly to 
consumers based on their 1981 sales plus 1 %. 
6. After reference quantities (quotas) were 
fixed for individual producers for a 12-
month period, individual producers were li-
able for a super-levy of 75% of the target 
price for all production in excess of their re-
spective reference quantities. When the ref-
erence quantities were fixed for dairies 
receiving milk, this levy was set at 100% of 
the target price for any excess marketings. 
Each individual country was required to en-
force collection of the super-levy. 
7. Provision was made for individual countries 
to establish a national reserve to provide 
some flexibility for special circumstances 
when initially allocating individual quotas. 
8. Reference quantities granted to purchasers 
or producers delivering to purchasers or sell-
ing direct to consumers are not freely trans-
ferable or saleable. The only exceptions are 
when a farm is sold, leased or transferred by 
inheritance. Member states may provide that 
a part of the quota so transferred be added 
to the national reserve. Essentially, quotas 
go with the farm or agricultural holding and 
become a part of the property rights asso-
ciated with it. 
9. Individual countries have the right to al-
locate reference quota to producers out of 
their national reserves to handle special 
situations or to permit structural change. 
10. Several countries offer additional voluntary 
programs to encourage smaller and older 
dairymen to cease production. While such 
programs differ by country, they essentially 
offer one or more annual payments to quali-
fying producers to stop milk production. 
All milk delivered by producers whether as 
whole milk, cream or manufactured on the farm 
into dairy products is subject to the quota pro-
gram. State farms, experimental programs, and 
all types of production units come under the 
jurisdiction of the program. If cream is sepa-
rated and sold, the milk equivalent comes under 
the mandate of the EC program. 
Experience with the EC Program 
The quota program completed its first year of 
operation in April 1985. In 1983, milk deliveries 
for EC-10 had amounted to 103.7 million metric 
tons. In the transition year 1984-85, the guaran-
teed total for the Community was set at 99.024 
million tons. In 1985-86 and subsequent years, 
the production base was 98.152 million tons. The 
required reductions or changes in the first year 
that quotas were imposed amounted to more than 
4% of marketings for the Community as a whole. 
In some countries like the United Kingdom and 
the Netherlands reductions of more than 9 and 
8% were required, respectively. 
The imposition of quotas halted the steady in-
crease in milk production in the EC in 1984-85, 
and at the end of the second year, April 1986, 
the guaranteed total of 98.177 million tons was 
essentially met. The size of the penalty for over-
quota deliveries has been a strong deterrent to 
additional production by individual producers. 
Thus, the gap between production and con-
sumption in all forms plus commercial exports 
has been stabilized. There remains a difference 
of more than 12 million metric tons between con-
sumption at 86 million and quota production of 
98 million. 
With a very large and complex system to ad-
minister, involving 10 quite different member 
states, the EC Commission is quite hopeful about 
the operational strength of the new program. A 
report to the Council of Ministers is required on 
the operation of the levy system and the program 
at the end of the 1986-87 operating year. It is 
too early to know how effective the social and 
political pressure among participating countries 
has been in enforcement of all the elements of 
the program. The very existence of the Common 
Market concept requires strict adherence to the 
rules and mandates as promulgated. National 
governments are responsible for administra-
tion and reporting on a regular basis to the 
Commission. 
The allocation of the global quota to 10 coun-
tries essentially freezes the proportions of Com-
munity production into the pattern of 1981. Be-
cause quotas are tied to farms or agricultural 
holdings within countries, except for portions 
acquired in national reserves, patterns of produc-
tion within countries are essentially fixed at 
least over the five years of the program to April 
1990. 
It is too early to draw many conclusions about 
the new system or its performance. Production 
was reduced in the first year very nearly as tar-
geted. A substantial gap between production and 
consumption remains despite the quota. Not 
much friction has arisen as yet because quotas 
are not freely transferable. 
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Edward V. Jesse, University of Wisconsin-Madison 
While a national mandatory quota program 
has never been adopted in the U.S., California, 
the second leading dairy state, operates a quota 
program for fluid milk. It is very different 
from the quota systems in Canada and the EC in 
that the California plan applies solely to milk 
sold for fluid products. 
The California program uses quotas to assign 
marketing rights to the higher-priced fluid mar-
ket. Producers are paid different uniform or 
blend prices depending on their production rela-
tive to individual quotas and production bases. 
Conditions Leading to the 
California Quota Program 
Prior to 1968, California Grade A or market 
milk producers contracted with plants for spe-
cific volumes of milk. Administered pricing in 
effect in California since the 1930s, set higher 
minimum prices for fluid milk, so producers con-
tracting with plants having high fluid utilization 
fared well compared to neighbors with identical 
quality milk who contracted with low-utilization 
plants. Competition was considerable among pro-
ducers for contracts with high fluid utilization 
plants, who held the upper hand in negotiating 
non-price contract terms like hauling rates. 
To address equity problems in allocating fluid 
milk sales among eligible producers, the Califor-
nia Legislature passed the Gonsalves Milk Pool-
ing Act in 1967. Under the Act, which became 
effective in late 1968, each licensed market milk 
producer was assigned a production base and a 
Class I quota. These were based on daily average 
milk sales during either 1966 or 1967. Because 
California has used component pricing for milk 
sales since 1972, the production base was total 
fat and solids-not-fat (SNF) sales expressed on a 
daily basis. Class I quota was fat and SNF sales 
under contract to fluid handlers. 
Due to widely-varying fluid sales opportu-
nities under the contract system, quota as a pro-
portion of production base differed substantially 
among market milk producers. To rectify these 
differences, 80 percent of any increase in Class I 
quota was to be allocated to existing producers 
according to their quota/production base ratio, 
with the remainder going to new entrants. 
Hence, as increases in fluid sales occurred, addi-
tional Class I quota was granted to market milk 
producers in inverse proportion to their ratio of 
quota to base. The intent was to "equalize" all 
market milk producers at a ratio of 95 percent. 
To speed the process, a blanket allocation of 
new quota was made in 1978 to equalize all pro-
ducers holding production bases at that time. 
This brought the total amount of quota well 
above the amount needed to meet fluid milk re-
quirements, a situation that persists today. 
Components of the California Program 
California milk quotas and bases do not re-
strict total milk production, but producers re-
ceive different prices for quota, base, and over-
base milk. At the state level, these prices depend 
on how much of total producer milk is used in 
each of four utilization classes: fluid (Class I), 
soft products (Class II), ice cream/frozen prod-
ucts (Class III), and hard products (Class IV). 
Quota milk is assigned to the highest (i.e., most 
valuable) use class for pricing purposes. Over-
base milk, which is milk production in excess of 
production bases, is assigned to the lowest class. 
Base milk, which is production base minus quota, 
is assigned to the residual classes. 
This procedure sounds very complex so an ex-
ample will help clarify how farm milk prices are 
calculated. Suppose California milk use by class 
for some month is as follows: 
Utilization Percent 
Class Price Used 
I $13.00 45 
2 12.00 7 
3 11.50 5 
4 11.00 43 
100 
Now, suppose producer marketings for the same 
month are distributed as follows: 
Quota Class 
Quota 
Base 
Over base 
Percent of Marketings 
50 
20 
30 
100 
Then, the prices for quota, base, and overbase 
milk would be calculated as follows: 
Quota Price: 
Overbase Price: 
(45% x $13) + (5% x $12) 
50% 
= $12.90 
(30% x $11) 
30% 
= $11.00 
(2% x $12) + (5% x $11.50) + (13% x. $11) 
Base Price: = $11.23 
20% 
In other words, the quota price is calculated by 
starting from the top down in terms of allocating 
milk value. The overbase price is calculated by 
starting from the bottom up. What's left over is 
allocated to base milk to establish its value. 
These prices for quota, base, and overbase 
milk would be the same for all market milk pro-
ducers at the same location and with comparable 
milk quality and composition. But the blend 
price received by a producer would depend on 
how much of the producer's milk fell into the 
three categories. A producer whose milk compo-
sition was 90 percent quota milk and 10 percent 
base milk would receive $12.73 per hundred-
weight in the above example (.9 x $12.90 + .1 x 
$11.23). A producer with 50 percent quota milk, 
20 percent base milk, and 30 percent overbase 
milk would receive $12.00. 
Similar to the Canadian program, quotas may 
be traded among California market milk pro-
ducers. Quota sales are expressed in dollars per 
pound of SNF per day. Prices vary with several 
factors, including the number of pounds of quota 
fat per pound of SNF (normally around 0.4 
pounds but different among producers), the 
amount of production base tied to the quota, and 
whether cows are sold along with the quota. 
However, the most important factor affecting 
quota prices is the difference in value between 
quota and over base milk. This value difference 
becomes capitalized in quota prices. For exam-
ple, the difference in price between quota and 
overbase milk in May 1986 was $1.70 per hun-
dredweight (based on average fat and SNF com-
position). The average price for quota transfers 
in May 1966 (quota price without cows) was $276 
per pound of SNF per day. At 8.7 pounds of 
SNF per hundredweight of milk, this translates 
to a cost of $2,400 per hundred-weight of whole 
milk per day. In other words, the investment 
necessary to obtain $620.50 in added milk rev-
enue per year ($1.70 x 365 days) was $2,400.00. 
That reflects a 26 percent annual rate of return. 
At the $276 per pound of SNF quota cost, it 
would have cost about $1,000 to purchase quota 
equivalent to the average daily SNF production 
of one dairy cow producing 15,000 pounds of 
milk per year. 
Experience with the 
California Program 
Unlike federal order blend pricing, the 
California system provides a price incentive for 
individual producers to control production. 
Under federal order pricing, all production is 
priced at the marketwide blend price. In con-
trast, production in excess of a California pro-
ducer's production base is priced at the overbase 
price. If the overbase price is below marginal 
production costs, then the California producer 
would be induced to cut back to production base 
levels. 
However, compared to the Canadian and EC 
programs, California's overbase milk price is 
quite high. The price for milk sold over-quota 
in Canada was equivalent to only 11 percent of 
their price support in the 1985-86 marketing 
year. In Europe, the price received for over-
quota milk is 25 percent of the price support. In 
recent years, the dairy price support program has 
yielded a price for overbase milk that has been 
high enough to cause a substantial increase in 
California milk production, much of which has 
been sold to the Commodity Credit Corporation 
as butter, powder, and cheese. In the 1984-85 
marketing year (October - September), California 
was the leading state in Commodity Credit Cor-
poration sales of butter and nonfat dry milk; 
third in cheese. Thus the California quota 
system has not balanced milk supply with 
demand. 
For some time, California producers have 
found it profitable to expand production of 
overbase milk, even though the overbase price 
has been below the federal support price. For 
instance, in May 1986, the California overbase 
price (average fat and SNF composition and 
prices) was $10.66 per hundredweight. The com-
parable support price in the same month was 
$11.31, and the M-W price (average Grade B price 
in Minnesota and Wisconsin) was $10.98. 
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Robert P. Story, Cornell University 
Mandatory supply management programs in-
volve the use of some type of production or 
marketing allotment or quota. The programs are 
mandatory because they are applied to all pro-
ducers of a specified commodity and not just to 
those producers who individually elect to par-
ticipate in such programs. 
National dairy pricing programs in the United 
States have never included mandatory supply 
controls. Supply controls have been an important 
element in the debate that has surrounded the 
formulation of national dairy pricing policy. In 
this leaflet, the features and impacts of a na-
tional quota program are investigated. 
Existing Dairy Price Programs 
Price support has been the key element of 
dairy price policy from its beginning in the 
1920s. Price support has been achieved primarily 
through the purchase of dairy products by the 
government, although voluntary supply manage-
ment programs have supplemented purchase pro-
grams on several occasions. 
During the 1930s, purchases of dairy products 
to support milk prices were very modest, exceed-
ing one billion pounds of milk equivalent in only 
one year. Since 1949 purchases have been made 
each year to support market prices. Market 
prices were maintained near support levels 
throughout the 1950s and '60s. Since the 1970s, 
market prices have deviated more (both up and 
down from support levels) than in the earlier 
periods. 
Support purchases exceeded 10 billion pounds 
of milk equivalent in 1954, 1962, 1981, 1982, 
1983 and 1985. These peaks in support purchases 
triggered legislation that modified the dairy sup-
port program and stimulated debate of alterna-
tives to the program. Mandatory supply man-
agement was an important element in the debate 
following each peak in support purchases, par-
ticularly in the 1960s and 1980s. 
Features of a Mandatory 
Supply Management Program 
A mandatory supply management program is a 
production control program in which all dairy 
farmers would be assigned a base, and there 
would be a substantial penalty price for market-
ings of over-base milk. Federal legislation would 
be necessary to adopt such a plan. Neither states 
nor dairy cooperatives have the ability to ad-
dress the national supply-demand-price issue 
with their own versions of base plans. 
There are two fundamental purposes that a 
national quota program would be directed to 
achieving: (I) to balance supply and demand, 
and if possible, at a price level high enough to 
permit "average" dairy farmers to enjoy a sa tis-
factory level of living; and (2) to permit dairy 
farmers to hold onto "their" individual share of 
the total milk market and not have the expansion 
of other dairy farmers reduce the price level and 
dilute their market share. 
Supply management has a solid economic 
foundation, geared to the principle that the 
demand for some dairy products (particularly 
fluid milk procducts) is price inelastic. That is, 
consumers do not respond in any substantial 
measure to whether prices go up or down--they 
still will purchase close to the same amount of 
dairy products. By restricting supply, milk 
prices can be increased, and yet demand will not 
be adversely affected in any major way. The net 
results is higher producer income. 
Mandatory supply management could reduce 
the costs of the current price support program 
and alleviate problems of storage and disposition 
of dairy products. Given probable program costs 
and budget restraints, mandatory quotas may 
receive greater consideration in the future. 
Most features of the current price support 
program would be continued with a quota pro-
gram. A target price would need to be estab-
lished each year and a purchase program for 
dairy products would continue to be necessary. 
Distribution programs would be needed to utilize 
dairy products that were acquired under the pro-
gram. Other additions to the current program 
would include: 
1. Procedures for establishing a national quota 
and for allocating the national quota to indi-
vidual dairy farmers. 
2. An over-quota price and procedures for de-
termining it would need to be established. 
3. Rules for transferring and reallocating quo-
tas would be needed. 
These features of a quota program could be ac-
complished in a variety of ways. The details of 
these f ea tu res would affect the effectiveness and 
the impact of the program. The following illus-
trates how these features might be determined. 
Establishment of Quotas 
A national milk quota might be determined by 
estimating the total commercial demand for milk 
and adding the quantity of milk needed for do-
mestic and international distribution programs. 
A reserve might be added to this total. 
The national quota might be allocated to indi-
vidual producers by relating it to the quantity of 
milk marketed by farmers in a designated base 
period. This base might be a 12-month period or 
the annual average of a longer period. If the 
annual national quota was 90% of total market-
ings by producers in the base period, the quota 
allocated to individual producers would be 90% 
of each producer's marketings during the base 
period. The national quotas could be reduced 
gradually over a period of years from near the 
base period level to a level that would balance 
milk supplied closely with total market needs. 
Gradual reduction would increase program costs. 
Over-Quota Prices 
For the program to be effective in curbing the 
expansion of milk production or cutting it back, 
the over-quota price would need to be low 
enough to discourage over-quota production. A 
low over-quota price would be needed to finance 
the purchase and disposition of dairy products 
associated with over-quota milk. The penalty for 
over-quota milk in the EC program is 75% of the 
target price. Under the Canadian program, the 
over-quota price was only 11 % of the quota price 
for the 1985-86 marketing year. 
Quota Transfer Rules 
Quotas could be freely transferable or saleable 
with or without geographic limitations. Transfer 
could be highly restricted as in the EC program 
where transfer of quotas is permitted only when 
a farm is sold, leased or transferred by in-
heritance. Sale or lease of annual quota rights 
might be permitted without authorizing the sale 
of quotas themselves. A wide difference be-
tween quota and over-quota price would give 
quotas or annual quota rights significant value if 
they were saleable. Both the Canadian and EC 
programs take back a portion of the quota when-
ever quotas are transferred. The acquired quota 
could be allocated to new or existing farms to 
facilitate expansion. Quota rules could require 
producers to fulfill a specified percentage of 
their quotas monthly. If they failed to do so the 
unfilled quota could be taken from them and 
transferred to other producers. Permitting the 
sale of annual quota rights would help to insure 
that the national quota would be filled each year 
and would serve to limit over-quota sales. 
Impacts of Mandatory 
Supply Management 
The impacts of a quota program would depend 
importantly on the details of the program and 
whether it was temporary or permanent. Since a 
specific program has not been proposed, only 
general observations can be made about the im-
pacts of a quota program at this time. 
Use of quotas could maintain milk supplies in 
closer balance with demand over time. More par-
ticularly, the periodic large surpluses that have 
characterized the dairy industry could be 
avoided. Government program costs could be re-
duced in part by shifting these costs to milk 
producers through assessments and to consumers 
through higher prices for milk/dairy products. 
If transfer of bases were restricted, existing 
resource patterns would be frozen, innovation re-
tarded and productivity gains limited. This 
would not be a serious problem if the program 
was temporary and used to eliminate an existing 
surplus problem. Quotas would have little mar-
ket value under these circumstances even though 
the over-quota penalty is large. 
If quotas were freely transferable or saleable 
and the program was not temporary, the quota 
would have considerable value, particularly if 
the penalty for over-quota milk was large. The 
annual value of the quota would be capitalized 
over future years under these circumstances. 
The value of the national quota under the Cana-
dian program in 1983 was estimated at more than 
$2,800 per cow. 
If there were equally profitable alternative 
uses of the dairy farm, the quota could be sold 
separately from the farm without subtracting 
from the sale value of the farm. If profitable 
alternative uses of a dairy farm were limited, 
the sale of the quota separately from the farm 
would subtract an almost equal amount from the 
value of the farm. Therefore, in some cases, the 
sale of quotas would result in a large windfall to 
the seller but in other cases it would not. The 
incentive to sell quota separate from the farm 
would be greater in areas with profitable 
alternatives to dairy farming. 
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Robert E. Jacobson, Ohio State University 
As the previous leaflets have suggested, 
U.S. programs have always managed the supply 
of milk through the price mechanism. Our 
objective was to gain some kind of a reasonable 
supply-demand balance, and the support price 
was adjusted up or down depending on whether 
milk was expected to be in short supply or in 
surplus. But in the 1980s, the milk industry has 
been confronted with chronic surpluses that are 
larger and more costly than most people are will-
ing to accept. Embryo transplants, bovine 
growth hormone, iso-acid supplements and a 
number of other technological breakthroughs 
suggest that there will be increasing supplies of 
milk at relatively low costs. As a result, 
increasing attention is being directed to a 
mandatory supply management approach. Given 
the background of the previous leaflets, this 
seven th and final article examines the farm and 
market level implications of a mandatory supply 
management program. 
Farm Implications 
Probably the stickiest elements of a manda-
tory supply management program come down to 
who holds title to the base and what kind of 
base transfer rules are in place. Farm-level im-
plications vary depending on how such rules are 
defined. For example, is title to base held by the 
dairy farmer (Canada) or is it assigned to the 
farm (Europe)? Can bases be transferred among 
dairy farmers (Canada), or is base transfer not 
permitted (U.S.--whole herd buyout base)? The 
usual view of supply management reflects the 
Canadian approach--bases assigned to the dairy 
farmer, and transferable. 
A frequently voiced objective of dairy price 
policy is to "save the family dairy farm". Supply 
management has been promoted as a method to 
accomplish that purpose. But the Canadian ver-
sion of supply management has neither slowed 
nor stopped the trend to fewer and larger dairy 
farms. In the past decade, the number of dairy 
farms in Canada has declined by 44%, while the 
number of farms with milk cows in the United 
States has dropped by only 35%. 
The Canadian experience does not mean, how-
ever, that supply management will not help save 
the family dairy farm. Part of the reason for 
Canada's continued dairy farm concentration is 
found in their rules for base transfer. Title to 
base is held by the milk producer, and he is free 
to sell his base or to purchase additional base 
from other milk producers. The net effect of 
these provisions has tended to encourage some 
producers to sell out and others to get larger. 
If we were to adopt a base plan in this coun-
try, we would not have to follow Canada's path. 
We could establish rules in which the government 
essentially holds title to the base, and no base 
transfer among producers would be permitted. 
The government would allocate base and reallo-
cate base by prescribed rules. The base of a 
retiring producer would revert to the govern-
ment. Such arrangements could slow the trend to 
fewer and larger dairy farms. 
Assuming base transferability, bases take on 
substantial value because they represent a privi-
lege to market milk and to receive a signifi-
cantly higher price for the base amount of milk. 
Therefore, the value of base becomes an asset in 
the farm balance sheet and an additional cost in 
the schedule of production costs. With a supply 
management program, with its price and quantity 
specifications at the farm level, questions arise 
concerning the impacts on milk production eff i-
ciency and resource allocation. Without supply 
management, it is assumed that competitive 
market equilibrium prices adjust resources and 
encourage efficient milk production. If bases 
are transfer able under a supply management 
program, most of the questions concerning milk 
production efficiency and economic resource 
allocation are resolved. Dairy farmers would 
buy base to expand and sell base as they retire in 
many instances. The question of allocating base 
to new producers must be addressed, but it poses 
no major problems if the total market is 
increasing. Knowing that the amount of milk 
that they can market at a desired price is fixed 
by the base, milk producers would shift their 
decision-making emphasis from that of growth 
and expansion to that of cost minimization for 
the quantity they can market. 
If bases are not transferable, the efficiency 
questions become more critical. Higher cost pro-
ducers would have very little incentive to exit 
from dairying and, in effect, would be subsi-
dized by the higher base price. Adoption of new 
technology would be slowed, and the entire in-
dustry would be less competitive. The burden of 
fine tuning the quota program in ways that 
would continue to invite progress and efficiency 
would be in the hands of government. 
Regionalization would emerge as a major con-
sideration in the adoption of a supply manage-
ment program. Historically, the use of Commod-
ity Credit Corporation purchases of butter, 
cheese, and nonfat dry milk to support the price 
of producer milk has permitted us to view dairy 
price support as a single national program with-
out significant regional ramifications. But 
mandatory supply management would force a 
change in that view. For example, Class I uti-
lization ranges from less than 20% in the upper 
midwest to higher than 80% in the southeast. If 
a quota program provided for a uniform cutback 
in supply across the nation, some areas would be 
short of fluid milk supplies while other areas 
would be affected very little. We have already 
observed some regional supply problems in the 
voluntary diversion and whole herd buyout pro-
grams. Mandatory supply management would 
force regional differentiation. 
Market Implications 
Most of the market implications of a manda-
tory supply management program are geared to 
the higher price level that the program would es-
tablish. While the demand for milk may be price 
inelastic, it still responds negatively to higher 
price levels. The milk industry in the U.S. has 
enjoyed a remarkable increase in commercial 
demand in the 1980s, and it is reaching a new 
record of 135 billion pounds in 1986. Some of 
that demand vigor is explained by the 15-
cen t/ cwt promotion assessment, and some of it is 
explained by relatively low retail prices for milk 
and dairy products. Higher prices could dampen 
the recent strength in commercial demand and 
remind us again of the continuing substitution 
issue confronting the milk industry. 
Since mandatory supply management could es-
sentially be programmed to balance supply with 
demand, the problem with dairy surpluses would 
virtually disappear. Government purchases of 
dairy products would occur only on a seasonal or 
sporadic basis, depending on what the program 
authorized. As a result, the costs of the dairy 
program, which have been in the $2 billion a 
year range in most of the 1980s, would be re-
duced to minimal levels. 
Many dairy cooperatives would face major 
operating adjustments under mandatory supply 
management. Dairy cooperatives have built milk 
manufacturing facilities on a large scale over the 
years to undergird their bargaining purposes and 
to guarantee their members a market. An esti-
mated 77% of producer milk in the U.S. is mar-
keted through cooperatives. When the manufac-
turing facilities are running near capacity, which 
is the case in periods of excess milk supply, the 
manufacturing facilities generally are in a 
breakeven to a profit-making situation. A man-
datory supply management program that could 
effectively reduce supplies would lead to a sit-
uation of some excess capacity, higher operating 
costs, and lower savings for farmer members. 
Competition for producer milk would inten-
sify with mandatory supply management. Pro-
ducers would find new pricing and hauling in-
centives to switch sales outlets and memberships. 
One effect of the competition would be to boost 
producer prices above the prices stipulated in the 
base program. Also, dairy cooperatives would 
find themselves in a stronger position to bargain 
for higher over-order premiums. The strong up-
ward pressures on producer prices that a supply 
management program would generate could mean 
that the program would have to incorporate price 
ceilings as well as price minimums in order to 
serve the public interest. 
A last market implication that should be rec-
ognized is that a tight supply-demand situation 
brought on by a base program could invite in-
creased imports of dairy products. In 1973 and 
1974, import quotas were relaxed substantially 
when milk production dropped abruptly and 
markets were short of milk. A supply manage-
ment program cannot be managed or adminis-
tered perfectly and additional imports could be 
required again to assure adequate supplies. 
Finally, a word about the politics of supply 
management is appropriate. It will never go 
anywhere in Federal legislation until a large ma-
jority of milk producers clearly indicate that a 
mandatory base plan is what they want. If a 
vote were taken today, it is not clear that 67% or 
even 51 % of the dairy farmers in this country 
would support mandatory bases. The difference 
among dairy farmers would be everywhere--be-
tween neighbors, between dairy cooperatives, and 
between regions. Beyond that, Congress has its 
doubts, and the current Administration has al-
ready drawn its line--NO. So we are looking at a 
program that is three to five years away at best. 
A quota program is a serious alternative. Our 
challenge is to further evaluate its long-term 
benefits and costs in formulating a dairy price 
policy that effectively serves its objectives. We 
should look closely at all the aspects of this 
approach before we leap. 

